TMEP 1207.01(b): Similarity of the Marks
October 2017 Edition of the TMEP
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1207.01(b) Similarity of the Marks
Under In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973), the first factor requires examination of "the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression." The test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but whether the marks are sufficiently similar that there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods or services. See Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc., v. Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Edom Labs., Inc. v. Lichter, 102 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2012); In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010). When comparing the marks, "[a]ll relevant facts pertaining to appearance, sound, and connotation must be considered before similarity as to one or more of those factors may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are similar or dissimilar." Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000). However, the analysis is based on the marks as depicted in the respective application and registration, without regard to whether the marks will appear with other marks, such as house marks, or other elements when used. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.4, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (indicating that applicant’s assertions that the applied-for mark would appear with applicant’s house mark were not considered in the likelihood-of-confusion determination); Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1464, 1470 (TTAB 2016) (rejecting applicant’s argument that, because its mark would appear along with its house mark and other distinguishing matter, the marks at issue were not confusingly similar); see also Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F. 3d 943, 950, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1847 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Registrations with typed drawings are not limited to any particular rendition of the mark and, in particular, are not limited to the mark as it is used in commerce.").
In evaluating the similarities between marks, the emphasis must be on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general, rather than specific, impression of trademarks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d per curiam, 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing Joel Gott Wines LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (TTAB 2013)); see also San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Electronics Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 2-3 (CCPA 1977) ("Obviously, the marks here are constructed of old linguistic elements, but they must be considered as wholes, and not on the basis of side-by-side comparison, and in the light of the fallibility of memory."); Neutrogena Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 410 F.2d 1391, 161 USPQ 687, 688 (CCPA 1969) (many consumers "may have but dim recollections from having previously seen or heard one or the other of the involved marks.").
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has provided the following guidance for evaluating the marks:
The basic principle in determining confusion between marks is that marks must be compared in their entireties and must be considered in connection with the particular goods or services for which they are used. It follows from that principle that likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark, that is, on only part of a mark. On the other hand, in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties. Indeed, this type of analysis appears to be unavoidable.
In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 750-51 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
When the goods or services are identical or virtually identical, the degree of similarity between the marks necessary to support a determination that confusion is likely declines. See Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 1337, 102 USPQ2d 1061, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1248 (TTAB 2010); In re Ginc UK Ltd., 90 USPQ2d 1472, 1477 (TTAB 2007).